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Increasing anti-malaria bednet take-up using information and distribution 
strategies: Evidence from a field trial in Senegal 
 
 
Abstract 
We evaluate the effects of different marketing and distribution techniques on the purchase of Long-
Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITN). Using an individually assigned quasi-randomized 
controlled trial in urban Senegal, we look at the impacts of different sale treatments. Receiving an 
offer to purchase an LL-ITN with a voucher valid for 7 days increases purchases by 23 percentage 
points, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer. We find suggestive evidence that providing 
information is not significantly correlated to the demand for LL-ITNs, but appears to be for 
individuals who have never attended school and have poor knowledge of malaria.  
 
 
 
Highlights 
 We evaluate the effects of different marketing and distribution techniques on the effective 
purchase of Long-Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITN) 
 We find that receiving a 7-day voucher significantly increases purchases by 23 percentage 
points, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer 
 Randomization should be preferred to alternation in the allocation of treatments. Alternation 
can induce discretion from enumerators. This can lead to discrepancies between the actual 
allocation and the targeted one. It can also cause imbalances across samples. 
 
Keywords: Malaria, Senegal, Randomized experiment, Bednets, Distribution campaign 
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1. Introduction 
The use of Long-Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITNs) has been shown to have a crucial 
impact in reducing the incidence of malaria and mortality of vulnerable groups such as children and 
pregnant women (Lengler, 2004). As such LL-ITNs is considered the most important malaria 
control tool by the Roll Back Malaria Partnership. Compared to just 3% in 2004, almost half of the 
at-risk population in Africa (49%) had access to an LL-ITN in 2013 (WHO, 2014). Because the use 
of ITNs has important spillover effects through the reduction of the mosquito population (Gimnig et 
al., 2003), there is an important opportunity for universal coverage. A malaria-free environment has 
positive effects on, for example, economic growth, development, school attainment and literacy 
(Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Bhattacharyya, 2009; Lucas, 2010; Barofsky et al., 2015). However, the 
target of universal access is far from being achieved and the level of use of such preventive tools 
remains low in countries with endemic malaria.1 As pointed out by household surveys, the vast 
majority of people who have an ITN do actually use it (WHO, 2014), particularly during those 
seasons where the probability of infection is highest. The crucial issue seems therefore effective 
access to, availability of and demand for bednets.  
 
An ongoing debate amongst health researchers and program directors regarding LL-ITN 
distribution frameworks considers whether it is it preferable to propose free distribution or to opt for 
some form of cost-sharing (see Sexton, 2011, for a review). This issue has notably been addressed 
by Cohen and Dupas (2010) in a randomized experiment on pregnant women in Kenya where it is 
found that the demand for ITNs is highly price sensitive and cost-sharing is not more cost-effective, 
in terms of child mortality, than free distribution. However, this is not the focus of our analysis. Our 
study constitutes an attempt to empirically evaluate the effects of different marketing and 
distribution techniques on the effective purchase of LL-ITN in a context where they are sold at a 
constant subsidized price to the general population.  
 
Different countries have adopted various policies to promote LL-ITN coverage. These include free 
distribution to targeted populations (via, for example, antenatal clinics), both free and cost-sharing 
distribution during mass campaigns and selling LL-ITNs at a subsidized price at various specialized 
places such as pharmacies. 14 countries in Africa sell LL-ITNs at a subsidized price (WHO, 2014). 
In our area of interest, Thies in Senegal, the last distribution campaign of LL-ITNs was organized in 
2009 and was characterized by cost-sharing. The campaign involved a door-to-door strategy to 
deliver a voucher for a subsidized LL-ITN, redeemable at a specific distribution point (health 
facility). Since 2009, general access to LL-ITNs has been available in private-run pharmacies at 
higher prices (around USD10) compared to the subsidized ones (USD3-6). By 2011, only 53% of 
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the Senegalese population had access to an LL-ITN [2]. Given this relatively low figure, our paper 
attempts to see whether, in addition to having the LL-ITNs available at a fixed point, an on-the-spot 
door-to-door sale would improve take-up. The interest in comparing these two strategies lies with 
the different economic incentives and constraints faced by households. An on-the-spot door-to-door 
sale could be successful under the assumption that people are not cash constrained, but that they 
might have limited attention (‘scarcity of attention’) to the necessity of buying a bednet. Drawing 
their attention to such a need brings it to the ‘top of mind’ (Shah et al., 2012; Datta and 
Mullainathan, 2014). Conversely, a household aware of the need to buy an LL-ITN may face cash 
constraints. In this case, a voucher allowing some flexibility over the purchase date of the net could 
relax these constraints and increase the incentive to buy. Our study is the first to shed light on the 
relative effectiveness of different distribution strategies and to investigate the underlying 
mechanisms.  
 
We thus offered subsidized LL-ITNs, at a price similar to the one set during the last national 
distribution campaign, for a limited period of time. The offer was addressed to the general 
population with no particular target in mind (i.e. not just vulnerable groups such as pregnant women 
or children). The study uses two treatments assigned through quasi-randomization (achieved 
through alternation). For the first, we quantitatively measure the impact of the distribution strategy 
on effective LL-ITN take-up. This treatment has two arms: first, we distribute door-to-door 
vouchers for the purchase of an LL-ITN, redeemable at a specific gathering points for seven days. 
This treatment arm mimics the government distribution campaign. Second through a door-to-door 
campaign we propose, at the same price as that of the voucher, an on-the-spot purchase of an LL-
ITN. By comparing the effect of these two arms, we can assess if a larger uptake could be achieved 
by selling on-the-spot or with a redeemable voucher. 
 
The second treatment, orthogonal to the latter, is related to information and assesses the role of 
knowledge of malaria and its prevention on the effective purchase of LL-ITNs. Studying the 
demand for subsidized bednets on the overall population is relevant if we consider that people 
buying bednets at subsidized prices are likely to buy other bednets in the future, at even higher 
prices (Dupas, 2014). We are able to estimate the heterogeneous effects our treatments had on 
relevant household characteristics at the baseline. In particular, we investigate: 1) the effectiveness 
of the voucher for different levels of income; 2) the effect of the information session at different 
levels of education and different levels of prior knowledge on malaria; 3) whether households with 
particularly vulnerable members (pregnant women or children under the age of five) are more 
susceptible of purchasing a LL-ITN following our two treatments and 4) if households who do not 
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own a LL-ITN are more likely to react to our treatments. Our study focuses only on uptake, as we 
do not observe actual use of the LL-ITN once purchased. 
 
The following two sections describe the Senegalese context and the methods we use (sampling and 
data). A further section covers in details our results and is followed by a discussion. The final 
section concludes by summarizing the results and offering a note on the relevance of our findings in 
a broader research context. 
 
1.1 The Senegalese context 
Malaria is an endemic disease throughout Senegal, with the entire population considered at risk. 
However, due to public intervention, significant improvements have been seen in the last 10 years. 
The share of outpatient visits resulting from malaria fell from 36% (clinically diagnosed and 
parasitological tested) in 2001 to 6% in 2008. About 7% of all deaths in children under five were 
attributed to malaria in 2008, compared to 30% in 2001 (President’s Malaria Initiative; Senegal 
Malaria Operational Plan FY 2013). Significant progress has been made with regards the presence 
and use of ITNs by households, particularly the most vulnerable ones, thanks to large-scale 
distribution campaigns which will be described below in detail. At the national level, the share of 
households declaring that they owned at least one ITN increased from 45% in 2005 to 63% in 2010 
(ANSD, 2012). Similarly, bednet availability has recently improved across Africa (Sexton, 2011; de 
Savigny et al., 2012). 
In Senegal, the untargeted sale of subsidized LL-ITNs is one of the active strategies of the National 
Malaria Control Program’s (NMCP) Strategic Plan 2011-2015. As suggested by WHO, this type of 
more routine ‘keep-up’ intervention should complement the occasional ‘catch-up’ mass distribution 
of free nets campaigns (WHO 2012). In the Senegalese context it is relevant to point out that 
distributional campaigns usually implemented some cost-sharing. At the time of our survey, there 
was neither a public campaign running nor was there a supply of subsidized bednets in Thies. To 
confirm this, we visited a number of health posts, health centers and hospitals in Thies during our 
pilot survey, in order to check their availability. This confirmed that no bednets were available at 
subsidized prices for the vulnerable population (pregnant women and children younger than five), 
nor for the population at large. LL-ITNs were available at privately run pharmacies at prices 
ranging from 5000 to 6000 FCFA (USD10-12), whilst non-impregnated bednets were also available 
on the market at 1500 to 3000 FCFA (USD3-6).  
 
The NMCP is targeting a 75% reduction in malaria-related mortality (with respect to the baseline 
year of 2010) alongside 80% LL-ITN coverage of the general population by 2015 (Senegal Malaria 
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Operational Plan, FY2013). To fulfill such objectives, a number of LL-ITN distribution campaigns 
were undertaken, via several different approaches: (i) periodic mass distribution, (ii) targeted 
subsidized LL-ITNs for vulnerable groups (pregnant women and children), (iii) untargeted 
subsidized distributions (through health facilities and community-based organizations). By 2013, 
more than three million LL-ITNs had been sold or delivered to Senegalese households (WHO, 
2014).2 The campaigns involved a door-to-door strategy that delivered a voucher for a subsidized 
LL-ITN redeemable at certain distribution points. The usual subsidized price was 1000 FCFA 
(USD2). The last campaign also included a series of communication interventions to advertise the 
campaign and to increase awareness of the importance of using bednets (Thwing et al., 2011). 
 
Health care in Thiès is organized according to a tiered system consisting of health huts (staffed by 
community health workers), health posts (staffed by nurses and certified midwives), and health 
centers or hospitals (staffed by medical doctors, nurses, and certified midwives). The health district 
of Thies has one regional public hospital and one privately run mission hospital. Data for this region 
shows that the ratio of inhabitants to health centers is seven times greater than WHO standards, 
while the ratio of inhabitants to health posts is in line with international norms (ANSD, 2008).. In 
Thiès, there is a large number of health huts, posts and pharmacies. These infrastructures are evenly 
distributed geographically and allow for health seeking behavior among households. Episodes of 
sickness, in particular malaria, are generally treated at health centers or hospitals. Furthermore, 
public campaigns currently allow people to test for malaria at subsidized costs (around USD1).  
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Survey area, sampling and data 
Data were collected in May and June 2012 in the city of Thies, the third most important city in 
Senegal with a population of about 263,500 inhabitants (2007 census) covering an overall area of 
approximately 20km square. The city is organized into nine neighborhoods. Our initial sample 
consists of 527 households which were selected across the whole territory of the city.3 In order to 
obtain a representative sample of the population, the number of households selected in each 
neighborhood was proportional to the corresponding population. Since an official list of households 
was not available in public records, households in each neighborhood were selected with a pseudo-
random selection technique, which followed Afrobarometer’s survey guidelines. Using an official 
map of the city, we chose a random set of streets in each neighborhood. A sample of households 
was selected on each chosen street. Prior to the beginning of the baseline survey, all neighborhoods 
were visited and the list of all streets with private houses was updated. Streets hosting a majority of 
economic activities (like markets, shops and public buildings), as opposed to housing, were 
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excluded from the list. Enumerators were instructed to enter and survey every fifth house on the left 
on each chosen street (making our selection process pseudo-random). In case the selected door was 
unoccupied, the enumerator had to select the next house. Where settlers were absent, or when 
neither the head of household nor the spouse was available, a second visit was scheduled. We 
employed nine local, independent and qualified enumerators. All had previous experience with 
surveys and field work and undertook a two-day training session given by the authors. Special 
sessions were dedicated to translation in the local language (Wolof) and to test enumerators’ 
understanding. Enumerators were also followed by a local experienced supervisor during the early 
stage of their work. 
 
As unit of analysis, the household, we consider nuclear units as composed by spouses, their children 
and other members of the family who economically depend of the head of the nuclear unit (Van de 
Walle and Gaye, 2005). Enumerators were instructed to randomly select among nuclear units when 
entering a house inhabited by an extended family. The reason of this choice lies in the fact that, 
most of the time, decisions on health behaviors are made at the nuclear unit. In our context, and this 
can safely be extended to the broader national level, the husband is generally considered to be the 
breadwinner and the head of the nuclear unit and as such is expected to take the most relevant 
economic decisions for the members of his unit (from now on called ‘household’). For 49% of the 
households surveyed the respondents was the head.4 In the remaining cases the respondent was 
most often the spouse or another adult member of the household. We investigate below the possible 
consequences of this. We compensated the respondents for the time spent answering the 
questionnaire with a phone recharge of 1000 FCFA (USD2), which was directly provided by the 
enumerator before leaving the house (a small minority of households did not own any mobile 
phone). 
 
Our baseline survey aimed to obtain information on each household member’s level of education,  
health problems (sickness and chronic diseases) and related expenditures, particularly concerning 
malaria. Since public campaigns about malaria specifically target pregnant woman and children 
under five years of age, we made sure to identify such households in our analysis. Household 
income represents the sum5 of all sources of monthly income (labour income or wage, rent and 
received transfers) across all active members of the household. Due to the sensitivity of such 
questions and the reticence to provide exact amounts, answers were in most cases collected by 
offering ten income intervals. We then categorized this variable into quintiles. We computed a 
synthetic measure of durable goods or assets owned by the households as a proxy for wealth. This is 
simply the sum of a list of items comprising, among others, a series of kitchen and home appliances, 
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mobile phone, bicycle, motorcycle, car, sewing machine, different pieces of furniture, etc. 
Additionally, we identified whether the household owned their dwelling unit. We tested, at the 
baseline, the knowledge of basic information on malaria and public bednet distribution policies 
through a set of true-false questions. We used five questions to test the level of knowledge on 
malaria.6 A second set of questions were aimed at understanding the extent to which people were 
aware of past public bednet distribution campaigns and their features.7 Concerning malaria 
prevention, we asked people to list all known methods. We also investigated what symptoms are 
associated with malaria, the knowledge of LL-ITNs and their market price. We collected 
information on the ownership, type, number, date and source of obtainment of any bednets in the 
house and the reason why one does not have one. For those declaring that at least one bednet was 
owned, we asked if it was used the previous night and by which member of the household.8 
 
2.2 Experimental design and empirical approach 
Treatments were assigned at the household level through ‘quasi-randomization’ (achieved through 
alternation), after stratifying at the level of neighbourhood. Around 43% of the sample received our 
short information session on malaria during the baseline survey, whilst the remainder did not. After 
testing prior knowledge of malaria causes, means of transmission, prevention and use of bednets, 
enumerators presented a short informational module of around 7 minutes. This provided 
information on the following eight points9: 1) How malaria can be contracted; 2) Incidence of 
malaria in Senegal and its particular impact on mortality and sickness for pregnant women and 
children under 9 years old; 3) Average size of health expenses due to malaria in the city of Thies 
(based on the data collected during our pilot survey); 4) Benefits from the use of LL-ITNs in terms 
of lower incidence of malaria, lower expenditure and consequent possible savings from its use (also 
based on the data collected in Thies during our pilot survey); 5) Importance of having a bednet for 
every bed and its use throughout the year; 6) Availability of bednets in Thies and where they can be 
purchased (namely at pharmacies at full price: around 5000 FCFA - USD10); 7) Availability of 
subsidized bednets during public campaigns and discussion on the timing of such campaigns; 8) 
How to effectively use LL-ITNs. Our two treatments were set up to mimic ones that could be 
deployed on a large scale such as a national campaign. As such the information needed to be 
uniformly conveyed in a relatively short period of time to a large audience. Its content (with the 
addition of point 3 listed above in this paragraph) is similar to different posters on the topic that can 
be found in various pharmacy or health clinics in the region. Our information treatment was thus 
not designed to be tailored to each participant with a refined curriculum that would engage with 
each participant’s experience with malaria. We understand that such a campaign is likely to be more 
effective but takes significantly more time and is practically difficult to implement on a large scale.  
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Independently from the information treatment, households were assigned to the LL-ITN sale 
treatment. About half of the sample (53%) was proposed the on-the-spot sale of one LL-ITN at the 
subsidized price of 1000 FCFA (USD2). The validity of the offer was immediate and lasted around 
15 minutes (the average time it took to complete the questionnaire at that stage). Respondents were 
allowed to discuss the purchase with anyone if they wished so. The second half of the sample (47%) 
received a voucher valid for 7 days, during which the respondent could contact the enumerator to 
receive one LL-ITN at the subsidized price of 1000 FCFA (USD2). Once ordered by phone, the LL-
ITN was delivered at an agreed meeting point by the enumerator. Each enumerator had one easy-to-
find point of delivery in each neighborhood.  
 
For the first treatment (information), we asked our enumerators to alternate one treated household 
with another non-treated while they were doing the baseline survey. The completed questionnaires 
were then returned. For this treatment, we have unequal size of groups between the info (211 
households, 43%) and no-info (279 households, 57%) arms. We initially targeted a proportion of 
around 50% of our sample to receive the info treatment but 37 questionnaires filled by one 
enumerator were discarded because we had doubts about the way he presented the information (we 
thought it was biased and non-neutral). These questionnaires could not be replaced due to time and 
budget restrictions. A discussion of the impact of such data loss on the external validity of the study 
is presented in section 4. Beyond that, we observe a 3% deviation (31 questionnaires) from the 50-
50 targeted allocation. Successive sequences of odd groups of questionnaires may explain an 
important part of this imbalance (e.g. succession of days in which an enumerator complete 5 
questionnaires with 3 treated and 2 non-treated). Given that the treatment assignment was done at 
the discretion of the enumerators we cannot rule out that some form of deviation from alternation 
took place or that some form of selection may have happen for a small number of households. 
However, we have no anecdotal evidence from the field to that effect. The results on the 
information treatment are thus interpreted with caution and as correlational.  
 
The second treatment (sale: voucher/on-the-spot) was assigned in a pre-randomized fashion. We 
would usually issue one enumerator a set of around 15 questionnaires (with small variations around 
that number) related to a neighbourhood. The allocation of treatment was communicated to the 
enumerators by assigning a label on each (for example: ‘voucher treatment’ or ‘on-the-spot sale 
treatment’). We have a smaller difference between the voucher (229 households, 47%) and on-the-
spot sale (261 households, 53%). We know that for a very small number of questionnaires (only 2) 
that instruction was not followed. The most likely reason for the remaining imbalance lays in the 
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fact that the assignment of label was made independently from one group of 15 questionnaires to 
the other: hence it is possible that we have ended up with 7 ‘voucher treatment’ and 8 ‘on-the-spot 
treatment’ in a succession of different groups of 15 questionnaires. The unsystematic nature of such 
deviation does not represent a threat to our identification strategy and to the causal interpretation of 
the effects of the sale treatment. It is important to add that our treatments were stratified by 
neighbourhood (i.e. the proportion of households assigned to each treatment group within a 
neighbourhood is equal to the total proportion of households in each group). Figure 1 shows the 
CONSORT flow diagram incorporating these elements. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Our baseline survey is followed by our first treatment (information session on malaria; control 
receives no information). Once that first phase is completed we offer our sale treatment (either the 
on-the-spot sale or the voucher valid for seven days). All the households who receive our first 
treatment were treated with either the on-the-spot sale (229 households) or the voucher valid for 
seven days (261 households). For all households initially selected we could thus determine if they 
bought an LL-ITN on the spot or within the seven day period and as such there is no attrition. We 
do not have an endline survey, nor did we need one for the following reasons: 1) the baseline and 
the two treatments were completed within two months; and 2) our fieldwork did not intend to look 
at LL-ITNs use over time. 
 
To assess the impact of the sale and information treatments on the effective demand for LL-ITNs, 
we estimate the following model through a linear probability model (LPM) by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS):  
𝐵𝑖 =   𝑋𝑖
′ 𝛽 +  𝛼 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 +  𝛿 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 
In the equation, B is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the household bought an LL-
ITN and the value zero otherwise. Info is a dummy variable that equals one when the household was 
provided with information on malaria. Voucher is a dummy variable that equals one when the 
household was given a voucher and equals zero if offered to buy a LL-ITN on the spot. X is a vector 
of covariates which contains respondents’ characteristics (gender, education, age, marital status), 
two indicators of household wealth, presence of household members who would benefit from free 
bednets in case of campaign (namely targeted groups: pregnant women or children under the age of 
five), household size, ownership of bednets (any type: whether insecticide-treated or not), 
experience of malaria cases in the last year and our two knowledge scores. Households are indexed 
with the subscript i. The coefficients of interest are α and δ, which measure the effects of receiving 
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information on malaria and of receiving a voucher on the respective probability of buying an LL-
ITN. As stated above, we faced minor problems related to partial compliance in the allocation of the 
sale treatment. This was the case for very small fraction of the sample: 2 questionnaires out of 490 
or 0.04% of the total number of questionnaires. This means that estimating the Intention to Treat 
Effect (ITT) does not offer different results from the specification above. 
 
We are also interested in testing four relevant hypothesis on the heterogeneous effects of the 
impacts coming from our treatments. First we want to know whether households with targeted 
members (pregnant women and children under the age of five) are more susceptible of purchasing a 
LL-ITN following our two treatments. Households with members belonging to these vulnerable 
groups may respond more positively to our information and voucher treatments by seeking to 
provide a LL-ITN for them. Second, we look at the effectiveness of the voucher for different levels 
of income. Our intuition is that the voucher could have a greater impact on the uptake for poorer 
households. It could give additional time to cash-constrained households to find the necessary funds 
for the purchase. Third, we want to check if the information treatment has a greater impact on 
respondents with low levels of education or low level of prior knowledge on malaria. The intuition 
being that the information we offer is likely to have less impact on respondents who already know a 
significant part of it. This may be the case for highly educated respondents and those who scored 
highly in our knowledge test about malaria. Finally, we want to see if households who do not 
already own a LL-ITN are more likely to react to our treatments. These households may ignore the 
benefit of owning a LL-ITN and our treatment may have a greater impact on them. Households who 
already own one have a better idea of their benefits and may be inclined to buy another one, either 
through our voucher or information session acting as a reminder. Conversely, such benefits may not 
be obvious to these owners and our treatment of little impact on the decision to purchase. The tests 
of treatments heterogeneities is based on the inclusion of the interactions of relevant treatments and 
the specific variables measured at the baseline in the model shown above.  
 
Sample balance across treatments is tested by comparing sample means of our variables measured 
at the baseline across different treatment samples. We compute adjusted differences between 
treatment and control groups, obtained from a regression of the baseline variable on the treatment 
variable and neighbourhood fixed effects, i.e. stratification variables. P-values of the T-test of the 
treatment coefficient are computed and shown. It is not uncommon for random assignment of 
treatments in small samples like ours to be unbalanced. The presence of observed differences 
between treated and non-treated groups is taken into account during estimation. The first approach 
used for this is to systematically include all relevant controls, in the set of covariates in our 
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estimation models. The second approach used is to re-weight the sample using entropy balancing so 
that the first three moments computed by treated and non-treated groups are equalized (Hainmueller  
and Xu, 2013).  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the allocation of the sample across treatments and the proportion of households 
who bought an LL-ITN within subsamples according to treatment status. Following the treatments, 
44 % of households purchased an LL-ITN. About 56% of household that received a voucher 
redeemed it within seven days and bought an LL-ITN at a subsidized price, compared to only 34% 
of households exposed to the on-the-spot sale. The difference of 22 percentage points between these 
two proportions is significant (p <0.001). Regarding the information treatment, 46% of households 
provided with the information bought an LL-ITN, slightly higher than the proportion of households 
(43%) who bought the LL-ITN with no additional information on malaria. In this case however, the 
difference is not statistically significant (p=0.151). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 reports, for the whole sample of 490 respondents, the mean and standard deviation for all 
variables which are relevant in the analysis. A majority of our respondents are female and live in a 
couple. 49% of our respondents are head of household of which 80% are male. These individuals 
represent 39% of our overall sample. In the next section we look at the potential impact of 
surveying non-head of households on the purchase of LL-ITNs.  
 
The average household size is six and around 45% of respondents attended secondary school or 
higher levels of education (successfully completed at least six years of schooling). 58% of the 
households surveyed are susceptible of being targeted households in a distribution campaign. That 
is to say they have at least one member who is either a pregnant woman or a child under five years 
of age. Around three quarters of our households own the dwelling unit where they live. Regarding 
malaria, we observed that 46% of sampled households had experienced at least one episode of 
malaria during the year prior to the survey.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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The average score out of 5 for the variable ‘Malaria knowledge score’ is 3.6 (median is 4).10 The 
mean of the variable ‘Anti-Malaria campaigns knowledge score’ (out of 3) is 2.1 and half of our 
sample correctly answered all questions; 13% correctly answered none. There is only a weak 
correlation (0.015) between the two knowledge scores. Across all levels of malaria knowledge 
score, a large majority of respondents are fully aware of what public bednet distribution campaigns 
involve, in terms of distribution sites, targeted groups (pregnant women and children under the age 
of five) and subsidized prices. Concerning malaria prevention, 93% of interviewees mention the use 
of bednets, 42% the employment of insecticide sprays and 59% the avoidance of stagnant water 
nearby the house. The most cited symptoms of malaria are high temperature (86%), nausea (60%) 
and headache (42%). Only 2% of respondents could not name any (correct) malaria symptom. 
These statistics convey a relatively high degree of awareness, means of prevention and 
identification of malaria. In spite of the awareness of the importance of the use of bednets, only 
28% of respondents declared that they knew what a LL-ITN was; only 12% knew the correct retail 
price of the product in private pharmacies. More than half of sampled household respondents (59%) 
claimed to have at least one bednet at home. The most common reasons for not having bednets are 
negligence (47%), lack of means (19%) and use of other methods (12%). Conditional on owning at 
least one bednet, the average number of bednets per household is about 2.4, whereas if we consider 
the whole sample, the number decreases to 1.4. Considering an average household size of 6 
members, it is entirely possible that the number of bednets owned is insufficient to cover the entire 
sampled population, even after considering the possibility that several members of the household, 
such as children or couples, share the same bednet. Among households owning a bednet, only 17% 
had impregnated ones.11 Moreover, although respondents claimed to have owned bednets for over 2 
years (on average), only 10% of owners had re-impregnated them within the last year. 41% of 
bednet owners paid to acquire them (the average price paid is about 2000FCFA, around USD4), 
whereas the remaining 59% said that bednets were obtained for free at health posts or centers, 
hospitals, or were distributed by the neighborhood chief or some NGOs during previous distribution 
campaigns. In the sample, 18% (22%) of pregnant women (children younger than five) responded 
that they slept under a LL-ITN the night preceding the interview. This number is slightly lower than 
the 22% (28%) who declared that pregnant women (children) slept under ITNs in the previous 12 
months according to the large scale DHS (2010-12).  
 
Table 2 also shows the tests for random assignment of treatments, through the comparison of 
adjusted means. Our quasi-randomization with respect to the sale treatment (voucher) appears to be 
satisfactory. Some significant differences are observed between households who were given the 
information treatment and those who were not. These are related to attributes of the respondent: 
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namely is gender, whether he/she is the head, education levels and the malaria knowledge score. 
The mean comparison tests also suggest significant differences with respect to household size. 
Additional balance tests, not shown, on all our nine neighborhoods and ten enumerator dummies, 
indicate that almost all (18 out of 19) of these controls are balanced with respect to our two 
treatment assignments.  
 
3.2 Results  
Table 3 displays the results of the LPM, estimated by OLS.12 The different columns present the 
regression coefficients of our treatment variables when we include baseline controls and 
neighborhood fixed effects. The first two columns display the results for the unbalanced sample and 
the last two the balanced one.13 We find that providing a voucher to buy an LL-ITN within seven 
days has a significant and positive effect on the probability of purchase, compared to an on-the-spot 
sale offer. The magnitude of the effect is between 22 and 24 percentage points. This corresponds to 
a 60% to 65.5% increase in take-up rate with respect to the control group receiving on the spot sale 
and no information. We also find that providing information on malaria has, on average, no 
significant effect on the probability of buying an LL-ITN14. Controlling for treatments, households 
in the first income quintile buy on average 19% more than rich ones (the fifth quintile is the 
benchmark). The coefficient for the first quintile is lower than for quintile two, three and four but 
the difference is not statistically significant. The various levels of education included in the 
specification appear to play no significant role (the reference group being post-secondary 
education). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In table 4 we investigate whether the effects of the two treatments display any heterogeneity. We 
first look at a targeted subpopulation: households with a pregnant woman and/or with a child under 
five years old (columns 1 and 2). The difference of estimated treatment effects within this group is 
not significant both for voucher and information. In column 3 and 4, we find that the voucher had 
no differential effect depending on the gender of the respondent, neither alone, nor in combination 
with the marital status (i.e. living in a couple). In column 5, the heterogeneity of the voucher effect 
is estimated across income quintiles. We find no heterogeneous effects of the voucher treatment 
along the household income dimension.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 here]  
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Finally, we investigate the heterogeneity of the information effect across education groups (column 
6) and baseline malaria knowledge scores (column 7). Receiving the information treatment session 
increases the probability of buying the LL-ITN by 34.5 percentage points for households where the 
respondent has no formal education, compared to those where the respondent has a high level of 
schooling (above secondary education). The result is significant at 5% confidence level. We also 
find that respondents with post-secondary level of education react to the information treatment by 
buying less (p-value=0.099). A positive and significant heterogeneous effect of the information 
treatment is found on respondents with low level of knowledge of malaria (+20 percentage points, 
significant at 10% level). In column 8, we find differential effects (+18.0 percentage points, 
significant at 5% level) of the informational treatment amongst households who do not own at least 
one bednet (any type: whether insecticide-treated or not). No effect is found for the voucher 
treatment for households who own already at least one bednet. Column 10 reports the results for the 
full model specification where all the interactions have been included. All previous results are 
confirmed except for the interactions between the informational treatment and both post-secondary 
education and low malaria score.  
 
4. Discussion  
The result on the informational treatment suggests that improving literacy on the prevention of 
malaria, on morbidity due to malaria or direct and indirect costs generated by an episode of malaria, 
has, on average, no significant effect on buying an LL-ITN. One interpretation is that the 
information session did not sufficiently increase the expected benefits of bednet usage to a level that 
outweighed the costs.15 It is also possible that knowledge about malaria was, on average within our 
sample, sufficiently high to make this session ineffective. The quality of the delivery of this 
information could have played a role. However, we believe this to be unlikely, given that the 
session was short and well-rehearsed by our enumerators during our pilot. The coefficient on the 
variable “info” is not affected if we introduce enumerators fixed effects. We also ensured that the 
content of the information session was identical across households and included health and financial 
framing. Both health and financial-related consequences of malaria were described to households, 
as well as various means of prevention. Enumerators were trained to deliver the information module 
uniformly. They were instructed to go through the eight information items listed above in the same 
sequence and to provide the same set of facts and details.  
The process of allocation of the information treatment may put the validity of our inference into 
question. First, the loss of 37 questionnaires in the information arm could influence the external 
validity of the study. These losses occurred in similar proportions in five out of nine 
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neighbourhoods, representing a loss of data ranging from 9.5 to 15% across them. We find that the 
37 households dropped from the sample are, on the whole, similar on average to the ones in the 
final study sample of 490. They differ for three variables out of the 18 used in our specifications in 
table 3: they are less likely to own the dwelling; more likely to belong to targeted groups during 
campaigns (presence of pregnant women or children under the age of five) and less knowledgeable 
about anti-malaria campaigns. Results are not shown but are available upon request. They are 
obtained by running a regression on a dummy which takes value 1 if a household was excluded 
from our sample (this applies to 37 households out of the 527 included for this estimation) and takes 
value 0 if it was not excluded. The controls consist of the 18 variables used in our models in table 3. 
Table 2 confirms that the allocation of both information and voucher treatments do not vary 
significantly along these three dimensions. Out of those three, low knowledge about anti-malaria 
campaigns is the only one significantly related to LL-ITN take-up (see table 3). However, it does 
not generate significant heterogeneous effects with both treatments (these interaction terms are not 
shown in table 4 but available upon request). Overall, these results seems to indicate that the data 
loss from the information treatment is unlikely to affect much the external validity of your findings. 
The study sample slightly underrepresents people with low level of knowledge about anti-malaria 
campaigns which positively predict take-up, although such dimension does not seem to significantly 
interact with the treatments. This implies that, if anything, the final take-up rate may be slightly 
underestimated.  
 
Second, as discussed above, the assignment of the information treatment was done through 
alternation, allowing some discretion to the enumerators. Although we do not have direct evidence 
that deviations from the instruction given occurred, the two arms sample sizes differ from the target 
(43% information vs 57% no information, instead of 50-50). We also find some variables along 
which the two treatment arms appear imbalanced. In the impossibility to establish the extent to 
which deviations (if any) was systematically related to some enumerator or neighbourhood and as a 
robustness check, we repeat the analysis and cluster the standard errors at these levels in turn. Our 
results, available upon request, are not affected. Nevertheless, the reader should interpret the effects 
related to the information treatment as correlational.   
 
It is notable that our tests, based on our actual sample sizes, could detect expected effect size at the 
design phase (of 10-15%) with power well above the threshold of 80%, which is widely considered 
as satisfactory. Thus, lack of power is not considered an issue.16 The ineffective role of information 
on take-up is not specific to this study; it has also been observed in different contexts, notably 
related to the purchase of health insurance and financial technology (Bonan et al., 2017; Thornton et 
 16 
al., 2010; Cole et al., 2013). Our finding is also in line with that of other works which found that 
social marketing treatments, under the form of promotional messages, had no effect on bednet 
purchase in Kenya (Dupas, 2009).  
 
The positive and significant effect on purchase obtained through the voucher shows the advantage 
in guaranteeing a subsidized price over a week. Households who use the voucher opt for a delayed 
purchase and do not need to have “cash-on-hand”, an amount of money to be used immediately, to 
purchase the LL-ITN. Our results seem to indicate that the most important factor at play is the cash 
constraints that households face. This constraint on take-up is also highlighted elsewhere (Dupas, 
2009 ; Holla and Kremer, 2009; Tarozzi et al., 2014). Another plausible explanation is that the 
respondent, who in 49% of cases was the head, needed to consult with their spouse or somebody 
else in the household in order to approve the purchase, which imposed a delay on the decision to 
purchase. As we mention earlier, men tend to have greater say over household purchases than 
women. If this mechanism is important we would expect that households in which a man was 
interviewed and presented the opportunity to purchase an LL-ITN would be relatively unaffected by 
the additional time to confer with other members. The man would be relatively able to make the 
decision unilaterally. However, given that the interaction terms of 1) respondent is male and 
‘voucher’ and 2) respondent is male, ‘voucher’ and the respondent lives in couple are both not 
significant in table 4 (in columns 3, 4 and 10), this explanation may not be valid within our context. 
Furthermore, results from table 3 in columns 2 and 4 where the dummy ‘the respondent is male’ is 
not significant seem to confirm this or could indicate that potential differences in preferences 
towards bednets for men and women do not seem to play a significant role. The lack of systematic 
gender differences in the willingness to invest in anti-malaria bednets is also found in another study 
(Dupas, 2009)17. 
 
Heterogeneous effects displayed in table 4 show that households with targeted members (pregnant 
women and children under the age of five) seem no more susceptible of purchasing a LL-ITN 
following our two treatments than other households. This despite emphasizing the incidence of 
malaria in Senegal and its particular impact on mortality and sickness for these groups in our 
information treatment. Results in column 5 indicate no significant heterogenous impact across the 
four different income quintile included (the benchmark being income the richest quintile 5). To get 
a coefficient for each of the five quintile for the sample which received the voucher we compute the 
marginal effects, using post-regression contrast margins for the model in column 5 (Figure 2).  
 
 [Insert Figure 2 here] 
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Figure 2 shows that with 95% confidence interval the first income quintile is not statistically 
different from zero, while all the other are (results holds if we use a 90% confidence interval). This 
indicates that the households belonging to income quintiles two to five are more likely to buy a LL-
ITN after receiving the voucher than when being treated with an on-the-spot sale. However, this is 
not the case for households in the poorest quintile who buy as much with both the voucher and on-
the-spot sale.   
 
Table 5 displays the rates of purchase per income quintile for both arms of the sale treatment. For 
the on-the-spot treatment, the share of households who purchased in the first income quintile (32%) 
is not significantly different to all other quintiles (at 5% level). As such, the poorest respondents do 
not appear comparatively cash constrained. If we compare the purchase rate for the voucher, 
respondents from the first quintile have the lowest rate. The first quintile is indeed the only quintile 
which shows no significant difference between the two arms of the treatment. The poorest do buy, if 
they can afford on the spot, and providing them with the flexibility of a 7-day voucher does not 
significantly change that rate. One reason could be that the poorest are not as cash-constrained as 
we imply. The mean household income for the first quintile is 49000 FCFA and a subsidized LL-
ITN at 1000 FCFA represents only 2% of their monthly income. Instead, the poorest might have 
limited attention (‘scarcity of attention’) to the necessity of buying a bednet. Drawing their 
attention, with an on-the-spot sale, to such a need brings it to the ‘top of mind’. If given a voucher, 
the poorest may have the cash at hands but decide to postpone the purchase for a few days. It is 
plausible that this then allows various other pressures and demands on their small income to take 
precedence. This may then divert their attention to other more pressing issues and expenses. Even if 
the LL-ITN stays salient this will take cash away from its purchase. This dynamic has also been 
found in different contexts (Shah et al., 2012; Datta and Mullainathan, 2014; Karlan et al., 2016). 
For the poorest, the strong incentives of a short-lived on-the-spot sale and the flexibility of the 7-
day voucher lead to similar rate of purchase.  
The descriptive statistics for both arms combined show that both income quintiles 1 and 5 have 
significantly lower rates of purchase than other middle quintiles (at a 10% level of significance). 
These differences, at the combined level, are partially explained by the fact that the poorest are less 
responsive to the voucher. Overall, the very poor are relatively more hampered in their access to 
LL-ITN, even when they are sold at such a low subsidized price. This should be stressed to 
governments and NGOs which organize distribution strategies that are based on cost sharing. For 
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the households in the richest quintile who could afford to buy a LL-ITN from a pharmacy without 
the subsidy we offer, our treatment appear less effective and represent a weak incentive.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The positive heterogeneous effect from the information session we observe for respondents with no 
education is confirmed by figure 3. Based on model 6 of table 4, it shows the predictive margins for 
all interactions of the information treatment and the four education levels.  
 
At the baseline, there are significant differences in our variable ‘malaria knowledge score’ across 
different levels of schooling. As intuition would suggest: respondents with no schooling tend to get 
lower scores than educated ones. This may partially explain why our information session has a 
positive and significant impact on the respondents with no schooling. Our information session also 
stressed direct and indirect costs of a malaria episode which was not covered in our five questions 
quiz used to construct the ‘Malaria knowledge score’. This type of financial information may have 
had a particular impact on the respondents who have never attended school. It is also possible that 
the fact that our information session was offered in a one-on-one environment could have been 
particularly suited to respondents who are unlikely to be able to read and to be reactive to different 
format of public campaign. There is also a significant positive heterogeneous effect from our 
information session for respondents who obtained a low malaria score (0-2) in our baseline 
knowledge test of five questions. Households who do not own a bednet (any type: whether 
insecticide-treated or not) previous to our treatments are more likely to react positively and 
significantly to the information treatment but not to the voucher.  
 [Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Our results highlight significant heterogeneous effects from the information session related to: lack 
of education and the use of bednet within the household and to low level of baseline knowledge on 
malaria. They suggest that information may be effective on those with no schooling, poor 
knowledge of malaria and those with no direct experience in the use of bednets. One can argue that 
these individuals are the ones who are likely to attribute a lesser value to the LL-ITN. According to 
our findings they can be influenced into buying an LL-ITN following our information treatment. 
These heterogeneous effects suggest that targeting the information treatment to these subgroups 
might represent a more efficient way of using limited advertisement or campaigning resources. 
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The use of alternation, instead of randomization, is more prone to enumerators’ discretion in the 
allocation of treatments. This makes it more difficult to track any mistakes or incoherences. A key 
lesson from our work is that alternation, to be correctly monitored, requires more time and a closer 
supervision on the field. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the demand for Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets (LL-ITNs) in a region 
where malaria is endemic and malaria prevention weak. Our study presents suggestive evidence that 
the information session is not correlated with the demand for LL-ITNs. This result is not surprising 
if we consider some of the recent literature on the effect of information on the demand for health 
related products. However, we observed a positive association between information and 
respondents’ low level of schooling, low knowledge about malaria and lack of direct experience in 
the use of LL-ITNs. This suggests that targeting households when giving information would be a 
more efficient way of increasing take-up. Both our descriptive statistics and our regression analysis 
indicate the importance of the role played by the voucher. Being given a 7-day voucher for purchase 
at a subsidized price increases the probability of LL-ITN purchase by 23 percentage points, on 
average, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer. This result may highlights the importance of cash 
constraints faced by many households across most income quintiles. Except for the very poorest 
households (1st quintile) who show similar rate of purchase for both the voucher and the on-the-spot 
sale.  
 
We think that our results from Thies could also be relevant to other cities of similar size in Senegal: 
Mbour, Rufisque, Kaolack, Saint-Louis and Touba. The context of bednets distribution and the 
local healthcare infrastructures are somehow similar in these sites. Taken jointly these medium size 
cities account for around a fifth of Senegal’s population. Whether we can extend the relevance of 
our results to poorer rural regions of Senegal is difficult to say: healthcare infrastructure are less 
developed and our different sale treatments would have to be adapted with more important 
reduction from the usual retail price. Our treatments would also need to be adjusted for the richer 
city of Dakar where bednets are relatively less expensive and more widely and consistently 
available in various shops/pharmacies. This is why we are cautious about extending our results to 
the whole of Senegal.   
                                                          
1 Out of 584,000 estimated malaria deaths, 90% occurred in Africa (WHO 2014). 
2 In some cases, LL-ITNs distribution was bundled with the delivery of vitamin A supplementation, deworming and/or 
mebendazole to targeted households. 
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3 Our study was designed to minimize any spillover effect by dispersing as much as possible the different households 
selected. By using the whole territory of Thies we managed to survey on average 35 heads of household per km square. 
According to estimates from the city of Thies the population density of the area is about 5900 inhabitants/km2. This 
makes spillover effects unlikely, however we cannot completely rule them out. Our neighbourhood fixed effects should 
control (at least partially) for such possible local effects. It is important to mention that we have no GIS data localising 
each of our households and as such it is impossible for us to construct a variable measuring the number of households 
treated within a given radius of a given household. However, measuring spillover effects is a difficult task in itself. If 
we were to generate a model where the outcome of each head depends linearly on her own characteristics and on the 
mean outcome of her reference group (or neighbours’ actions or take-up within a given radius) we would face the 
‘reflection problem’ (Manski, 1993). This implies that we would be unable to distinguish between 1) contextual effects 
or more generally spillover effects, from 2) correlated effects: individuals in the same reference group tend to behave 
similarly simply because they can be similar with respect to certain characteristics or face a common environment. In 
other words, if we were observing that people assigned to the ‘voucher’ arm tend to buy more when living in clusters 
with high shares of people who bought an LL-ITN assigned to the on-the-spot arm, this would not necessarily be due to 
spillover effects. Our study design was not meant to rigorously assess these issues. 
4 Different reasons can explain why we could only have half the heads answering the questionnaire. In many cases they 
do not live on the dwelling visited for work related reasons and only pay regular/irregular visits to the household. A 
limited number of heads did not have the time to answer and delegated either their spouse or another adult. We did not 
meet anybody who refused to take part in the survey.  
5 An alternative to this addition would be to use an index generated from principal component analysis. If we use  the 
first principal component instead of the sum, the results presented in the paper would  remain similar.   
6 We asked respondents to state whether the following statements were true or false (the share of correct answers is 
given in parenthesis): 1. Malaria is a contagious disease (30) (false); 2. Mosquitoes contaminate food (68)  
(false); 3. Mosquitoes transmit the disease in daylight (73) (false); 4. Mosquitoes reproduce themselves in stagnant 
water sites (98) (true); 5. Mosquitoes transmit malaria by just biting the skin (91) (true). 
7 We asked to state whether the following statements were true or false (the share of correct answers is given in 
parenthesis): During a public bednet distribution campaign: 1. If I go to the health centre I can get free bednets for 
children less than 5 (65) (true); 2. Pregnant women can get free bednets at health posts and health centres (69) (true); 3. 
Everybody can get bednets at subsidized prices at health centres (76) (true). 
8 We also collected data which allowed us to elicit discount rate and risk parameters. These parameters were used as 
control variables in a previous version of this paper and they did not have any effect on take-up of bednets.  
9 A detailed description of the content of the information session is provided in Appendix 1. 
10 To investigate heterogeneity along the knowledge of malaria in the regression analysis which follows, the malaria 
knowledge score has been split into two categories, low (0-2) and high (3-5), whose shares in the sample are 14.5 and 
85.5%, respectively. There are no significant differences in these shares across the sub-samples for our two treatments. 
11 It is likely that the number of ITNs or LL-ITNs is underestimated due to the lack of awareness of the properties of the 
product. 
12 The size and significance level of marginal effects for the treatment dummies using logit and probit are very 
similar from those obtained with OLS for our different models. The full set of results is available upon request. 
13 The differences we observe between the two sets are small and attributable to a satisfactory random assignment for 
the voucher treatment and only some significant differences for the information treatment. 
14 We do not find a significant effect from the interaction of the two treatments in the various models we display. 
Adding this interaction term does not change the magnitude of the treatment coefficients estimated in Table 3. 
15 Alternatively, because of liquidity constraints, people might not have been able to pay either on the spot or within a 
week for a LL-ITN, despite the expected high benefits. 
16 If we fix the level of power at 80% and use a 10% alpha, our design could detect the following effect sizes: i) 0.095 
for the voucher arm based on the actual uptake rate for the on-the-spot arm of 0.34 and ii) 0.097 for the info arm based 
on the actual rate of uptake for the no info arm of 0.43.  
17 It is possible that the effect of the voucher comes from a combination of time to think about the decision to buy as 
well as a ‘deadline effect’. However, we do not have data on the timing of the purchase relative to the seven-day 
window and thus cannot investigate any ‘deadline effect’. It is also possible that over the seven days covered by the 
voucher, individuals collected additional information on the LL-ITNs. We did not ask such question at the time of 
purchased. However, we think that being exposed to additional information would not significantly push individuals to 
buy. If this was the case, we would expect the information treatment (which provided information on prices and many 
other details on LL-ITNs) to have a significant effect on the probability to purchase the LL-ITNs for the sample of 
individuals who received the seven-day voucher. This was not the case. Finally, we cannot discard entirely that there is 
a small chance that individuals with the on-the-spot sale offer believed that they would be able to still buy an LL-ITN 
later at the subsidized prize. However, these believes were unlikely to be based on a foreseeable possibility to purchase 
at a subsidized price through a publicly funded distribution campaign. At the time of our fieldwork, no LL-ITNs 
distribution campaign was scheduled or announced. Such distribution campaigns represent, to our knowledge, the only 
opportunity for locals to buy at a subsidized price.  
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Appendix 1 
Our information treatment consisted in providing the following eight points of information: 
1) The malaria parasite is transmitted primarily at night, when someone is bitten by a female 
mosquito. 
2) Malaria is the first cause of mortality in Senegal for pregnant women and children under 5 years. 
3) Malaria is the main reason behind most medical consultations for Senegalese and therefore the 
main item for health care spending. 
4) Our research in the city of Thies shows that households that use bednets are less affected by 
malaria and spend least for treatment. Households who use bednets regularly can make about 
2000FCFA of savings per year in health care expenditures. 
5) According to the Senegalese Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization: the best way 
to prevent malaria is to sleep under a bednet. 
6) It is important to have mosquito bednets for all family members and use them throughout the 
year. 
7) Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets are available in health centers and hospitals. 
8) Mosquito nets are free for pregnant women and for children under five at health centers. For the 
rest of the population they are available at a subsidized price of 1,000 FCFA.  
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Figure 1. CONSORT flow diagram 
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Figure 2. Contrast predictive margins for the coefficients Voucher*Income quintiles  
 
Notes: 95% confidence interval, based on model 5 presented in table 4. 
 
 
Figure 3. Contrast predictive margins for the coefficients Info*Education levels  
 
Notes: 95% confidence interval, based on model 6 presented in table 4. 
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Table 1. Allocation across treatments and rate of household who bought LL-ITN by treatment 
 
Treatment  Information  
Treatment Sale Yes No Total 
Spot Sale 0.36 0.33 0.34 
 
(102) (159) (261) 
Voucher 0.55 0.57 0.56 
 
(109) (120) (229) 
Total 0.46  0.43 0.44 
 
(211) (279) (490) 
Note: Fractions refer to the proportion of households who bought a LL-ITN; figures within brackets represent the size 
of each subsample, the total sample is 490. 
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Table 2. Mean, standard deviation, and comparisons of adjusted means of different treatment arms 
    Balance of treatments tests 
   
Information Treatment Voucher Treatment 
 
Mean SD Mean Diff P value Mean Diff P value 
      Treat Control     Treat Control     
The respondent is male 0.388 0.488 0.348 0.441 -0.094 0.035 0.397 0.379 0.018 0.688 
Age of the respondent 44.559 13.527 44.086 45.185 -0.973 0.429 44.153 44.916 -0.794 0.515 
The respondent is the head 0.488 0.500 0.444 0.545 -0.104 0.023 0.515 0.464 0.051 0.266 
Respondent has no educ 0.288 0.453 0.330 0.232 0.095 0.019 0.262 0.310 -0.052 0.195 
Respondent has primary educ 0.263 0.441 0.262 0.265 -0.007 0.869 0.279 0.249 0.031 0.436 
Respondent has secondary educ 0.276 0.447 0.240 0.322 -0.079 0.050 0.306 0.249 0.060 0.135 
Respondent has post-secondary educ 0.173 0.379 0.168 0.180 -0.008 0.806 0.153 0.192 -0.039 0.252 
Household head is Male 0.880 0.326 0.871 0.891 -0.017 0.574 0.873 0.885 -0.010 0.721 
The respondent lives in couple 0.900 0.300 0.903 0.896 0.007 0.785 0.900 0.900 -0.001 0.976 
Household size 5.969 2.600 6.140 5.744 0.421 0.074 5.843 6.080 -0.243 0.298 
Targeted hh during campaign 0.584 0.493 0.588 0.578 0.009 0.846 0.590 0.579 0.013 0.778 
Income quintile 1 0.192 0.394 0.172 0.218 -0.050 0.155 0.192 0.192 -0.003 0.942 
Income quintile 2 0.204 0.403 0.219 0.185 0.034 0.349 0.210 0.199 0.010 0.791 
Income quintile 3 0.200 0.400 0.194 0.209 -0.015 0.684 0.197 0.203 -0.006 0.874 
Income quintile 4 0.273 0.446 0.280 0.265 0.015 0.708 0.253 0.291 -0.035 0.384 
Income quintile 5 0.131 0.337 0.136 0.123 0.016 0.611 0.148 0.115 0.034 0.273 
Household owns dwelling unit 0.743 0.438 0.749 0.735 0.011 0.777 0.747 0.739 0.010 0.798 
Assets (sum of items) 7.982 4.505 7.896 8.095 -0.105 0.790 7.694 8.234 -0.520 0.185 
>1 episode of malaria previous year 0.463 0.499 0.444 0.488 -0.037 0.413 0.437 0.487 -0.046 0.298 
No bednet in the hh 0.402 0.491 0.423 0.374 0.041 0.346 0.415 0.391 0.017 0.692 
Malaria knowledge score, out of 5 3.606 1.026 3.509 3.735 -0.207 0.025 3.572 3.636 -0.055 0.545 
Anti-Malaria campaigns knowledge 
score, out of 3 2.120 1.095 2.072 2.185 -0.089 0.348 2.114 2.126 -0.013 0.889 
Notes: Diff is the adjusted difference of means between Treated and Control. P-val is the P-value of the treatment coefficients in a regression where baseline variables are regressed 
on the treatment variables and neighbourhood fixed effects. The shares of respondents in income quintiles 4 and 5 differ substantially from 20%. This is due to the fact that we have 
a disproportionate number of observations at a particular value (a midvalue of an income interval in the questionnaire) which cannot be split and is set to belong to quintile 4.
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Table 3. Take-up of LL-ITN, main effects 
  Dependent variable =1 if purchased LL-ITN 
 
Unbalanced sample Balanced sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Treatment Sale (Voucher) 0.220*** 0.239*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 
 
(0.0442) (0.0430) (0.0446) (0.0420) 
Information session -0.00270 0.0200 -0.0133 0.0164 
 
(0.0446) (0.0437) (0.0452) (0.0435) 
The respondent is male 
 
0.000885 
 
0.00751 
  
(0.0546) 
 
(0.0538) 
Age of the respondent 
 
0.00189 
 
0.00250 
  
(0.00210) 
 
(0.00212) 
Respondent has no education 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.116 
  
(0.0810) 
 
(0.0798) 
Respondent has primary education 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.116 
  
(0.0789) 
 
(0.0771) 
Respondent has Secondary education 
 
0.0375 
 
0.0484 
  
(0.0713) 
 
(0.0708) 
Respondent lives in couple 
 
0.0431 
 
0.0414 
  
(0.0776) 
 
(0.0789) 
Household size 
 
0.00526 
 
0.00913 
  
(0.00936) 
 
(0.00956) 
Targeted household during campaign 
 
-0.0192 
 
-0.0321 
  
(0.0504) 
 
(0.0492) 
Income quintile 1 
 
0.185** 
 
0.200** 
  
(0.0835) 
 
(0.0819) 
Income quintile 2 
 
0.319*** 
 
0.336*** 
  
(0.0812) 
 
(0.0807) 
Income quintile 3 
 
0.218*** 
 
0.207*** 
  
(0.0755) 
 
(0.0731) 
Income quintile 4 
 
0.252*** 
 
0.268*** 
  
(0.0694) 
 
(0.0673) 
Household owns the dwelling unit 
 
-0.0845 
 
-0.0705 
  
(0.0544) 
 
(0.0539) 
Assets (sum of items) 
 
0.0103* 
 
0.00887 
  
(0.00601) 
 
(0.00628) 
At least one episode of malaria previous year 
 
0.0787* 
 
0.0722 
  
(0.0444) 
 
(0.0440) 
No bednet in the hh 
 
-0.0353 
 
-0.0387 
  
(0.0473) 
 
(0.0473) 
Low malaria score (0-2) 
 
-0.102* 
 
-0.121** 
  
(0.0599) 
 
(0.0585) 
Low anti-malaria campaign score (0-1) 
 
0.112** 
 
0.114** 
  
(0.0482) 
 
(0.0480) 
Constant 0.303*** -0.117 0.263*** -0.137 
 
(0.0856) (0.172) (0.0704) (0.173) 
     Observations 490 490 490 490 
R-squared 0.074 0.160 0.080 0.173 
Neighbourhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dependent Variable 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications 
include neighbourhood fixed effects. The mean dependent variable refers to the take-up rate of 
the group which received on the spot sale and no information. 
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Table 4. Take-up of LL-ITN, heterogeneous effects 
 
Dependent variable =1 if purchased LL-ITN 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                     
Treatment Sale (Voucher) 0.236*** 0.203*** 0.268*** 0.256*** 0.232** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.283*** 0.283** 
 
(0.0431) (0.0680) (0.0548) (0.0541) (0.111) (0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0431) (0.0558) (0.131) 
Information session (Info) 0.104 0.0211 0.0213 0.0208 0.0174 -0.174* -0.00695 -0.0522 0.0193 -0.168 
 
(0.0683) (0.0438) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0440) (0.105) (0.0477) (0.0550) (0.0438) (0.131) 
Info*Targeted group -0.144 
        
-0.104 
 
(0.0914) 
        
(0.0945) 
Voucher*Targeted group 
 
0.0612 
       
0.0389 
  
(0.0888) 
       
(0.0900) 
Voucher*The respondent is male 
  
-0.0744 
      
-0.396 
   
(0.0923) 
      
(0.347) 
Voucher*Respondent is male*Respondent lives in couple 
   
-0.0446 
     
0.342 
    
(0.0912) 
     
(0.340) 
Voucher*Income quintile 1 
    
-0.0959 
    
-0.0879 
     
(0.154) 
    
(0.155) 
Voucher*Income quintile 2 
    
0.0971 
    
0.105 
     
(0.150) 
    
(0.150) 
Voucher*Income quintile 3 
    
0.00946 
    
-0.00938 
     
(0.146) 
    
(0.146) 
Voucher*Income quintile 4 
    
0.0127 
    
-0.0136 
     
(0.142) 
    
(0.144) 
Info*Respondent has no education 
     
0.345*** 
   
0.280** 
      
(0.133) 
   
(0.138) 
Info*Respondent has primary education 
     
0.196 
   
0.161 
      
(0.135) 
   
(0.138) 
Info*Respondent has Secondary education 
     
0.171 
   
0.165 
      
(0.133) 
   
(0.137) 
Info*Low malaria score (0-2) 
      
0.199* 
  
0.137 
       
(0.117) 
  
(0.120) 
Info*No bednet in the household 
       
0.180** 
 
0.155* 
        
(0.0892) 
 
(0.0911) 
Voucher*No bednet in the household 
        
-0.110 -0.0966 
         
(0.0913) (0.0942) 
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Constant -0.158 -0.0956 -0.133 -0.128 -0.115 0.00287 -0.0932 -0.0570 -0.137 0.0117 
 
(0.184) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.185) (0.192) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.203) 
           Observations 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 
R-squared 0.164 0.161 0.161 0.160 0.163 0.172 0.164 0.167 0.162 0.191 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighbourhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean Dependent Variable 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include the set of controls as in table 3 and neighborhoods fixed effects. 
The mean dependent variable refers to the take-up rate of the group which received on the spot sale and no information. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Rates of purchase across income quintiles for both the voucher and on-the-spot sale. 
  on-the-spot sale voucher   combined 
 
n mean SE n mean SE P-value n mean SE 
income quintile 1 50 0.32 0.067 44 0.41 0.075 0.38 94 0.36 0.05 
income quintile 2 52 0.35 0.067 48 0.67 0.069 0.001 100 0.5 0.05 
income quintile 3 53 0.32 0.065 45 0.58 0.074 0.01 98 0.44 0.05 
income quintile 4 76 0.41 0.057 58 0.66 0.063 0.004 134 0.51 0.043 
income quintile 5 30 0.23 0.079 34 0.44 0.086 0.08 64 0.34 0.06 
Notes: n is the sample size for each subsample; P-value is shown for a two-sided test of equality between the voucher and on-the-spot means.  
 
